This paper assessed the relative potency of financial repression and liberalization in Nigeria. The relative effect of financial development on economic growth during these two policy periods was considered using multiple regression analysis which was tested and proved not to be spurious. Furthermore, the paired comparison test was employed to determine whether financial liberalization causes observed improvement in the growth of the economy. The results reveal that financial development during the period of financial liberalization significantly impact more on the growth variable (GDP). Also, the paired comparison test shows that financial liberalization causes observed improvement in the growth of the economy and the well measured financial development. The banking system however is noted to be bedecked with crisis. The researcher therefore recommends that putting in place financial superstructure should precede the adoption of financial liberalization in order to reap the best thereof.
INTRODUCTION
Financial repression is a deliberate and calculated distortion of financial prices by regulatory authorities in an economy. It includes administrative tinkering by governments with financial prices such as interest rates and exchange rates (Ayadi, Adegbite, Ayadi, 2008) . In the words of Denizer et al (1998) , it refers to a set of policies, laws, formal regulations and controls imposed by government on the financial sector. These controls distort financial prices, interest rates and inhibit the operation of financial intermediation at their full potential. Financial repression is characterized by rigid exchange and interest rate controls, mandatory sectorial allocation of bank credit and quantitative ceiling in bank credits to the private sector. McKinnon (1982) contends that one of the reasons for financial repression is to give government power to control chronic fiscal deficits. While Cho (1986) argues that since several developing countries have poorly developed equity markets coupled with a preponderance of bank loans in corporate financing, financial repression could be appropriate.
Financial liberalization on the other hand, has to do with removal of all restrictions, controls, regulations and hence distortions imposed by the government on financial assets and its prices. Schmidt Hebbel and Serven (2002) observe that financial liberalization grants market forces a dominant role in setting financial asset prices and returns, allocating credit, and developing a wider array of financial instruments and intermediaries. Bandiera et al (1999) note that the wave of liberalization in many developing countries in the 1980s was characterized by more attention given to market forces in allocating credit through freely determined interest rates.
Many financial economists such as King and Levine (1993) , Levine et al (2000) , Darrat and At-Sowaidi (2010) , Esso (2010) , Omoke (2010) to mention a few show that real economic growth is robustly linked to financial development. However, Ayadi, Adegbite and Ayadi (2002) in their study conclude that financial development and economic growth have no consistent relationship in post-SAP Nigeria. While Nzotta and Okereke (2009) conclude that the financial system has not sustained an effective financial intermediation, especially credit allocation and a high level of monetization. In none of these studies however, is any attempt made to separate and compare relative performance of financial development in the period of depression and that of liberalization.
This study is therefore set to investigate the relative potency of financial development on the economic growth in Nigeria in these two different policy periods. Also, the study will investigate the robustness of financial liberalization on the performance of the financial deepening and the growth of the real GDP.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the words of Demirguc -Kunt and Detragiache (1998) the trend towards financial liberalization is part of a broader trend towards reduced direct intervention of the state in the economy. In a number of developing countries, however, financial liberalization is also a deliberate attempt to move away from "financial repression" as a policy to fund government fiscal imbalances and subsidize priority sectors, a move strongly advocated by the influential work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) . According to McKinnon and Shaw, financial repression, by forcing financial institutions to pay low and often negative real interest rates, reduces private financial savings, thereby decreasing the resources available to finance capital accumulation. Both of them agree that economic growth is severely hindered in a repressed financial system by the low level of savings rather than by the lack of investment opportunities. Fry (1997) notes that the use of interest rate ceilings in a repressed system, distorts the economy in four critical ways. For instance current consumption is favored compared to future consumption and instead of lending to financial institutions via deposits, potential investors engage in relatively low-yielding direct investment. Denizer et al (1988) on the other hand argue that financial repression can correct market failures in financial market, lower cost of capital for companies and improve the quality of loan applications by selecting out high risk projects. Stiglitz (1993 Stiglitz ( ,1994 contends that financial repression if used in conjunction with export promotion schemes, or preferential credit schemes, could encourage the flow of capital to sectors with beneficial technology spillover.
The 9th APEC Finance Ministers Process (2002) notes that financial repression affect resource allocation through a number of additional channels: High reserve requirements and credit controls increase substantially the costs of intermediation, erode banks' competitiveness, and channel an important restricted bank financing to the private sector, coupled with the low real interest rates for bank deposits, caused considerable expansion in an already large informal credit market (particularly in 1987 -1988 , when inflation picked up) where interest rates were freely determined and, generally speaking, reached higher levels than those offered by government securities such as CETES. Demetriades and Luintel (1997) , Fry (1997) , King and Levine (1993) , Omole and Falokun (1999) , Owoye (1997) , Ikhide and Alawode (2001) , Levine (1997) , Claessens and Klingebiel (2001) , Adebiyi (2002) , Ayadi (1996) , Chete (2001) , Oyewole (1994) , Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) and Gruben and McComb (1999) among other financial researchers, agree that financial repression inhibits financial deepening by depressing real rates of interest. Demetriades and Luintel (1997) argue that deficiency of financial saving is associated with rationing of credit in favor of priority sectors in developing countries. This thwarts economic development through adverse effects on volume and productivity of investment. Cho (1986) justifies financial repression on the ground that several developing countries have poorly developed equity markets coupled with a preponderance of bank loans in corporate financing. Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989:205) are convinced that the financial repression paradigm is "a kernel of truth and a vast exaggeration". The consensus seems to be that financial reform in itself, as envisaged in the financial repression paradigm is desirable, but where it has failed, it was either due to the design and sequencing of the reform measures (McKinnon, 1988) , or caused by adverse factors such as external shocks and macroeconomic policies during the process (Corbo et al, 1986 ).
Many authors have analyzed the impact of financial liberalization on growth. King and Levine (1993) and Levine and zervos (1993) show that financial intermediation development is a good predictor of economic growth, even after controlling for country characteristics and growth determinants. Time-series studies confirm that financial development predicts growth (Neusser and Kuglar, 1998; Reusseau and Wachtel, 1998) . However, the empirical literature has not been able to resolve this theoretical controversy. Some studies such as that of Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, (1995) , Kraay, (1998) and Rodrick, (1998) found that financial liberalization does not affect growth, while others stood their ground that the effect is positive (Levine, 2001 , Bekaert et al., 2003 and Bonfiglioli and Mendicino, 2004 ), yet others that it is negative (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003) . Many authors show the effects to be heterogeneous across countries at different stages of institutional and economic development (see Bekaert et al, 2003, and Edwards, 2001 ) and countries with different macroeconomic frameworks (Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2001 ). Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) provide additional evidence on the positive effect of financial development on the economy's GDP growth. Omoke (2010) concludes that trade openness and financial development have causal impact on economic growth. Others who find similar results that financial development is important for economic growth are Gallego and Loayza (2002) , Soukhakian (2007) , Esso (2010) Okpara (2010) to mention a few. However, Yacel (2009) in his study of Turkish economy for the period 1989 to 2007 concludes that financial development has a negative effect on growth. Bennett et al (2001) find a negative significant effect on financial development on the private saving rate. Tokat (2005) argues that the effects of the increase in financial fragility have surpassed the marginal benefits of financial liberalization. Demirguc -Kunt and Detragiache (1998) contend that in a liberalized financial system where interest rates are market-determined, nominal interest rates are likely to be more viable than in a controlled one (although real rates may not be) since one of the functions of banks as financial intermediaries is to "transform" short-term liabilities (deposits) into long-term assets (business and consumer loans), banks are exposed to the risk of an increase in nominal interest rates, and may become more vulnerable in an environment where interest rates are more volatile. Caprio and Summers (1993) and Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, (1994) , emphasized that another factor that may contribute to moral hazard is the erosion of bank franchise value due to the removal of ceilings on deposit interest rates and to the reduction of other barriers to entry: as monopolistic profits disappear due to increased bank competition, that cost of losing a banking license when the bank becomes insolvent is reduced, and incentives to choose a riskier loan portfolio increase. Unless these perverse incentives are controlled through effective prudential regulation and supervision, increased risk taking due to moral hazard can become a powerful source of financial fragility, as demonstrated in numerous banking crisis episodes.
Financial liberalization in so many parts of the globe has led banking sectors hit by a remarkable number of problems, some of which erupted in full-fledged systemic crises as documented in the extensive studies of Caprio and Kliengebiel (1995) and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) . In a number of cases, for example in Chile in 1981, banking sector problems emerged shortly after the financial sector was deregulated. Ranciere et al (2004) , and Tornell et al (2004) document that banking crisis may arise as a by -product of the higher growth generated by financial liberalization in countries with credit market imperfections. Reinhart and Tokathidis (2001) provide evidences from a sample of 25 countries that financial liberalization has predictive power on banking crises.
In Nigeria, after the financial liberalization and relaxation of bank rules, the number of banks increased from 41 in 1986 to about120 in 1992 but eventually was hit by arising systematic risk that pruned down the number by 26 banks that saw themselves liquidated in 1988 alone. By 1995, about 60 banks were liquidated. Non performing loans in this year was N44.5 billion which rose to N49.6 billion in 2004. This severe problems led to the mutation of bank capitalization to N25 billion by the Nigerian monetary authorities (Okpara, 2009) . Thus, in a situation of incessant and indiscriminate bank failures, credit creation, financial deepening and hence economic growth will likely be hampered.
Naude (1995) notes that the balance sheets of banks in Africa are characterized by a dominance of shortterm lending and short-term deposits. Long-term markets for funds are virtually absent in most cases implying that if financial liberalization is to succeed in developing financial markets and in facilitating trade liberalization and export expansion, incentives have to be created for banks to expand their activities from being brokerage firms to being maturity transformers.
In fact, the issue of the impact of financial liberalization has remained controversial especially for the developing countries. Schmidt -Hebbel and Serven (2002) contend that financial liberalization is not risk-free and should be carefully implemented to attain its benefits. Excessive rapid financial reforms often lead to unsustainable credit and activity booms which then leads to financial crisis. These risks they maintain increase significantly in the absence of prudential regulation and strong supervision of banks and other liberalized capital market segments. Okpara (2010) recommends that governments pursuing financial liberalization should set up an agency that will follow up action to forestall bank failure.
METHODOLOGY
Regression analysis will be employed to compare the performance effect of financial development on economic growth during financial repressions and financial liberalization. The rule of thumb (R 2 < or > d) will be used to examine whether the regression analysis is spurious so as to pave (or not to pave) way for unit root and cointegration test.
To determine the effect of financial liberalization on financial deepening and economic growth, the researcher employs the paired comparison test. When a researcher's work involves this type of design, a non independent t test statistics can be used for analysis of data. The formular for the non independent t test is given by. 
The degree of freedom for the non independent t test is N-1
The data are sourced from the secondary data published in the Statistical Bulletin of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The variables involved are the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP, the ratio of broad money supply to narrow money supply, the ratio of broad money supply to GDP and the ratio of commercial bank credit to GDP as proxies to financial development while growth indicator is proxied by GDP.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the period of financial repression, the real GDP and the financial deepening variables are highly correlated, highly fitted with no autocorrelation and the overall regression is significant. As Granger and Newbold (1974) suggested, an R 2 > d is a good rule of thumb to suspect that the estimated regression suffers from spurious regression. Since the coefficient of multiple determination R 2 is less than the Durbin Watson's statistic, d (0.912< 1.841), we conclude that the regression is not spurious.
The result reveals that apart from the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP which exerts a positive and significant influence on the real GDP, the rest of the three variants of financial development are insignificant in influencing the real GDP. Notably, broad money supply as a ratio of GDP exerts a negative but insignificant impact on GDP.
The period of financial liberalization also documents high coefficient of determination and therefore shows a goodness of fit and the overall regression is highly significant. However, the relationship is autocorrelated which probably could be as a result of omission of other important policy variables spurred by the structural adjustment programme in 1986.
The results further reveal that apart from the ratio of private sector credit to GDP which exerts positive and significant impact on the growth of real GDP during repression, the rest of the three variants of financial deepening namely, the ratio of narrow money supply to broad money supply, the ratio of commercial bank deposits to GDP and the ratio of broad money supply to GDP exert significant impact on the real GDP during financial liberalization. Noted again is that the ratio of broad money supply to GDP exerts a negative impact on real GDP just as it did during repression except that it becomes significant with liberalization .
The behaviour of this variable (M 2 /GDP) in both periods is contrary to the a priori expectation and has raised some doubts about the validity of its use as a proxy to financial deepening variables in the developing economy. Abu-Bader and Abu-Qam (2008) argue that in developing countries, a large part of M 2 stock consists of currency held outside banks and as such, an increase in the M 2 /GDP ratio may reflect an extensive use of currency rather than an increase in bank deposits. For this reason this measure is less indicative of the degree of financial intermediation by banking institutions. The researcher in support of this assertion refers to other variants as well-measured ones.
The paired comparison tests in tables 3-6 show that financial liberalization causes observed improvement in the growth of GDP and financial deepening proxied by the ratio of narrow money supply to broad money supply and that of private sector credit to GDP.
In the light of the analysis of the relative potency of financial repression and liberalization, it can be deducted that financial development's reaction to economic growth during liberalization is more pronounced and impactive. Thus, financial liberalization aids financial development and economic growth in Nigeria. This is in line with the findings of King and Levine (1993) Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) , Levine et al (2000) Darrat and At-Sowaidi (2010) , Esso (2010) Omoke (2010) and a host of other economists contending that, real economic growth is robustly linked with financial development. It is imperative to add that financial liberalization not only aids financial development (defined above) but also catalyzes the growth of the economy. The result of the finding that financial liberalization aids economic growth contradicts the contention of such researchers as Grlli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , Rodrick (1998), Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) while corroborating with the findings of Mckinnon (1973) , Shaw (1973) Levine (2001 ) Bakaert et al (2003 , Bonfliglioli and Meadicino (2004) and so on .
The theoretical evidence strongly support the assertion that financial liberalization leads to banking crisis but the researcher believers that if financial superstructure which must among others include a sound capital base, adequate prudential guideline, strong supervision of banking and capital markets, and in general improved financial intermediation should be effectively put in place prior to the adoption of financial liberalization, the yield of liberalization policy will be immeasurable. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION:
Financial liberalization is simply a 'move-away' from financial repression. The researcher having assessed the relative effect of financial development on economic growth during these policy periods, finds that financial development during the period of financial liberalization impact more on the growth of the economy implying that financial liberalization aids financial development which in turn exerts significant influence on the growth of the economy. Furthermore, the paired comparison test shows that financial liberalization cause observed improvement in the growth of the economy and the well measured financial development. However, to avert a run on banks and reap immeasurable dividend arising from financial liberalization, financial superstructure which must include among others, adequate prudential guidelines, sound capital base and strong supervision of banking and capital market should be put in place.
